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ARTICLES:

- (1) Guam relocation pact: Japan to reinforce roadmap with U.S.

MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full)  
April 15, 2009

The Diet, in its current session, is expected to approve the intergovernmental agreement reached between Japan and the United States on the planned relocation of U.S. Marines in Okinawa to Guam. The Diet's de facto approval of the Guam relocation pact will reinforce the 2006 roadmap for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. However, it is unclear how many Marines will actually be relocated to Guam. Moreover, the government reportedly plans to take on a funding share of up to 2.8 billion dollars (approx. 280 billion yen) for the Guam relocation. Its estimation for the cost, however, is also unclear. Futenma airfield is to be relocated in a package with the Guam relocation, but a settlement on the Futenma relocation issue is still beyond the horizon. There is still no knowing what is in store for the planned relocation of U.S. forces in Japan.

#### Grounds for estimated spending invisible

The relocation of Okinawa-based U.S. Marines to Guam is linked to the U.S. military's global transformation. This Guam relocation is one of the pillars of the U.S. military's realignment in Japan, and it is intended to mitigate Okinawa Prefecture's base-hosting burden. The roadmap says 8,000 Marines and 9,000 family members will be moved to Guam.

Japan's share of the burden of the Guam relocation was set by the government at 2.8 billion dollars (approx. 280 billion yen) in the pact. This was meant to dissolve the Japanese government's fear of having to bear a further burden. At the same time, the government wanted to send the pact to the Diet for approval so that it could not be easily abrogated.

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The Foreign Ministry repeatedly gives this official explanation: "Since we are spreading out the large cost over many years, we will be able to obtain the public's understanding through Diet deliberations." However, one high-ranking official of the government revealed: "We kept in mind that there might be a possible change of government to the DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan), which is opposed to the Guam pact."

The total relocation cost is estimated at 10.27 billion dollars (approx. 1.027 trillion yen). Of this, Japan will take on a total of 6.09 billion dollars (approx. 609 billion yen). The Japanese government will directly spend up to 2.8 billion dollars from its state coffers for the construction of such facilities as a headquarters and billets on Guam. In addition, the Japanese government will fund the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), which will finance or provide loans for the projects to construct such infrastructure as housing and water supply and sewerage systems.

Construction work in Guam will start this fiscal year. The government has earmarked 68.9 billion yen in its initial budget for U.S. force realignment, an increase of 3.6 times over the preceding fiscal year. This amount includes 34.6 billion yen for the Guam projects, including land development in the Finegayan district of Guam for housing construction for noncommissioned officers.

The Japanese and U.S. governments are currently in the process of consulting on specific projects down the road. However, Japan will still have to provide nearly 250 billion yen in outlays over five fiscal years, 2010 through 2014, the target year to complete the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. Some Japanese government officials are growing concerned about Japan's burden sharing. "I wonder if we can continue such huge spending in this economic crisis," said a senior official of the Defense Ministry. The government will not specify in detail the grounds for estimating the spending of 2.8 billion dollars, leaving everything murky.

The government first said the U.S. Marine Corps would move 8,000 troops from Okinawa to Guam. In a House of Representatives deliberation on the Guam pact, however, the government changed its previous explanation, saying the figure is not the actual number but is the regular number of Marines. In his Diet reply, Prime Minister Aso stated that the Okinawa-based Marines numbered about 12,000 as

of the end of 2008, but at the same time he also explained that the regular number of Marines remaining in Okinawa after the Guam relocation would be about 10,000. To calculate simply, it is also likely that only 2,000 will be relocated to Guam. However, the government did not specify anything in detail about this likelihood. An opposition party lawmaker criticized the government's account, saying: "The question is how many will actually be moved to Guam. That's unclear."

Futenma deadlock to result in delaying realignment

The roadmap worked out by the Japanese and U.S. governments features the transferral of Marines to Guam and the relocation of Futenma airfield to the coastal area of Camp Schwab. When President Obama and Prime Minister Aso met in February, they agreed to the implementation of the roadmap in a steady way.

However, the Diet's approval of the Guam relocation pact is a far

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cry from giving momentum to completing the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan by 2014. The relocation of Futenma airfield still remains deadlocked among the government, Okinawa, and the United States. The Guam relocation pact also says the Guam move depends on progress achieved in the Futenma relocation. But the Futenma relocation is falling behind schedule, which could mean a delay in the Guam relocation.

Some government officials are therefore exploring ways to settle the pending issue of relocating Futenma airfield. The government is in a hurry to have the issue settled at an early date, while Okinawa Prefecture and its base-hosting municipalities are strongly calling for moving the Futenma alternative's construction site to an offshore area. "There should be no problem even if we move the construction site just a little," said a senior official of the Defense Ministry.

Futenma airfield will be relocated to the Henoko district of Nago City in Okinawa Prefecture, and the Defense Ministry conducted a field survey there to assess the potential impact of the newly planned facility's construction site on its environs. The Defense Ministry has now presented Okinawa Prefecture with its preliminary report of findings from the environmental assessment. The report concludes that the government plan is optimum. Even so, it also shows flexibility with room being left for revisions to the government plan for the alternative facility's offshore siting.

The question, however, is whether Japan can make the United States give way to Okinawa's call. The United States has so far insisted on relocating Futenma airfield "as agreed." In point of fact, Prime Minister Aso and other government officials cannot be sure of it. A solution has yet to come into sight.

In addition, the Japanese and U.S. governments have other plans in a package to realign the U.S. military presence in Japan and alleviate the burden of base-hosting localities through such measure as returning the sites of U.S. military facilities located south of Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture and redeploying U.S. carrier-borne fighter jets from Atsugi Naval Air Station in Kanagawa Prefecture to Iwakuni Marine Air Station in Yamaguchi Prefecture.

(2) "Impossible to envisage" feasibility of Ozawa proposal, says Okinawa governor

SANKEI ON LINE (Full)  
12:20, April 17, 2009

Referring to the plan to relocate U.S. forces Futenma Air Station to the coastal area of Camp Schwab, located in Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Ichiro Ozawa said, "There are plenty other alternative sites." Concerning this remark, Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima during a press conference on April 17 said, "It is impossible to envisage how to make such an idea Japan's real policy and undertake coordination (with the U.S. side)."

Concerning a case in which power shift is realized in the next Lower House election, Nakaima noted, "I find it difficult to envisage how the relocation issue will develop, when a different party takes the reins of government."

(3) Editorial: Futenma relocation plan will not move forward with

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the Guam agreement alone

ASAHI (Page 3) (Full)  
April 17, 2009

The House of Representatives has approved the agreement between Japan and the United States to relocate U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The pact is now likely to clear the Diet in the current session.

The agreement specifies the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Ginowan to the Henoko district in Nago and the shift of 8,000 Marines and their approximately 9,000 dependents to Guam at the same time. The pact also stipulates the provision of approximately 6 billion dollars by the Japanese government.

Reducing the base burden is the top priority for Okinawa, which hosts 70% of U.S. bases in Japan. The relocation of Futenma Air Station that sits right in the middle of the residential area will be a symbolic event. It could be an epoch-making event, as well. Nevertheless, many questions have emerged from Diet deliberations on the pact.

One of them is the number of Marines to be moved to Guam. The recently released 2009 Diplomatic Blue Book also notes that 8,000 Marines and their 9,000 dependents are scheduled to be moved to Guam by 2014. But it has become clear that 8,000 will be slashed from the number of troops assigned to Okinawa, which is different from the actual number of troops stationed in the prefecture.

The number of Marines assigned to Okinawa stands at 18,000, but because some of them have been dispatched to various parts of the world, there are only 13,000 troops in the prefecture at any given time on average. The number of their dependents comes to 8,000, which is fewer than the planned reduction figure.

Asked about the actual size of reduction, Prime Minister Aso said: "We don't know." This means the government does not know the size of the burden on the local residents after the reduction.

The Japanese government is to contribute up to 2.8 billion dollars to the construction of the new Marine headquarters and barracks on Guam. But the number of barracks to be built is unknown. Grounds for the 2.8 billion dollars have not been explained either.

Ginowan Mayor Yoichi Iha criticized the government's response, telling a Lower House committee: "Japan and the United States have agreed to alleviate the burden on Okinawa, but how they will actually reduce the burden remains unclear. We cannot sense the government's eagerness." The mayor's reaction is natural.

We must not forget, however, that even if the agreement is approved by the Diet, it does not mean the issue is settled. The matter will not move forward until after Okinawa and Nago approve the relocation of Futenma Air Station to the Henoko district.

To build the new airport, authorization for landfill work must be obtained from the Okinawa governor. Local residents have been opposing the plan, citing the noise issue and other factors, and Governor Hirokazu Nakaima has been requesting the alternative facility be located further offshore than the current plan.

The government has indicated that it will discuss options with local

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municipalities, including the possibility of partially altering the plan, but full-fledged discussions have yet to take place. Making

changes requires the concurrence of the United States. There are many hurdles that need to be cleared. A general election will take place by the fall, and the future of the Aso administration remains unclear.

Postponement might end up returning the relocation plan to square one. It has already been 13 years since the leaders of the two countries agreed to relocate the airfield. The Guam International Agreement clearly specifies Japan's financial contribution to the relocation. But will the two countries be able to accomplish the major goal of lessening the burden on Okinawa?

(4) North Korea's brinkmanship diplomacy: U.S. has yet to come up with specific measures

TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Full)  
April 17, 2009

Eiji Tsukiyama, Kaname Fukuda

Following the adoption of the UN Security Council (UNSC) president's statement condemning its launch of a long-range ballistic missile, North Korea expelled monitors of the International Atomic Energy Agency from the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. It appears that the North is trying to realize direct talks with the Obama administration, practicing brinkmanship diplomacy with the aim of putting on a show of crisis. Chances are, however, that the North may toughen its hard-line stance, depending on what response the U.S. makes.

The North is really talking to China

The DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement at an unprecedentedly fast speed right after the adoption of the UNSC chairman's statement. The statement noted that it would never return to the Six-Party Talks, thus declaring its secession from the framework using very strong terms.

A South Korean expert on the North said, "The UNSC has adopted the president's statement, but given the specifics, it is a de facto sanction. The strong wording used in the declaration is a reflection of North Korea's anger at China for its failure to prevent the adoption of such a statement." The expert pointed out that North Korea was really talking to China by adopting such strong terms in the declaration.

The Six-Party Talks were started during the former Bush administration. A South Korean daily analyzed the reason North Korea is rejecting the Six-Party Talks this way: "It is a message that the North wants to nullify the U.S.-North Korea relations of the Bush administration and return to the relations of the Clinton administration, which adopted a policy of engaging it."

Similar case in 2002

The declaration to restart the nuclear facilities and the expulsion of IAEA monitors are, in fact, quite similar to the "second nuclear crisis," which started in 2002.

At that time, the U.S. raised the issue of suspected nuclear

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development by North Korea. Strongly opposing the U.S. move, North Korea, which had expected to see ties with the U.S. normalized, declared it would restart its nuclear facilities, and expelled IAEA monitors. It declared that it would opt out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. In February, North Korea restarted operations at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and extracted plutonium, a raw material for nuclear arms. The Six-Party Talks were launched in August of that year in order to find a solution to the crisis.

What is more complicated this time, compared with the crisis that stated in 2002, is that the North Korean Foreign Ministry's statement noted that it would independently build a light water reactor, which uses low-enriched uranium. An expert on North Korea

viewed this as an indication of North Korea's determination to acquire the technology to manufacture enriched uranium. The obstacles to conducting talks with the North are growing.

#### Future image

According to the South Korean government, the North removed about 6,500 of the 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor when it disabled the plant. This process will be suspended. To begin with, North Korea is expected to go ahead with the restoration of the reprocessing plant. It would then move on to the process of extracting plutonium, which is a raw material for nuclear bombs.

Dongguk University Professor Ko Yu Hwan said, "The Obama administration has yet to come up with a specific policy for North Korea." The professor said that it is vital for the U.S. to indicate an image for the future of its approach to North Korea like the Perry Process during the Clinton administration, in which the U.S. tried to improve relations with the North by urging it to change in stages.

A source connected with the South Korean government stressed that Japan, the U.S. and South Korea will deal with North Korea calmly and in unison, while noting that it is premature to talk about a second Perry Process when IAEA monitors are now being expelled from the North.

There is, however, concern that if the U.S. stumbles in dealing with the North, it might carry out a nuclear test.

(5) Interview on Japan-U.S. alliance with Shotaro Yachi, former vice foreign minister and now government representative: Japan should fulfill responsibility as global citizen

MAINICHI (Page 9) (Full)  
April 17, 2009

Yoshiaki Nakagawa

-- What effect do you think North Korea's recent missile launch will have on security in East Asia?

When looked at from the viewpoint of peace and safety in East Asia, China (which holds the key to regional security) prefers the status quo. There is no major power trying to change the present situation. But if North Korea accrues more nuclear weapons and missiles and becomes a big power, it will become a destabilizing factor in the region. It is necessary for Japan and other major countries to

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consider how they should jointly prevent such a situation. The Six-Party Talks have made steady efforts but failed to realize the desired result. On the contrary, the talks resulted in making the situation more unstable and making it more difficult to deal with North Korea.

-- The previous Bush administration took a tough stance toward the North in the first half but a reconciliatory stance in the latter half. Attention is now being focused on the Obama administration's North Korea policy.

The Obama administration has placed importance on international cooperation and dialogue. I guess senior diplomatic officers in the U.S. government will soon start efforts to establish relations with North Korea. In its latter half, the Bush administration tried to elicit results by compromising with North Korea. But the administration gained little while offering much.

-- What prospect do you have about the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance?

The Japan-U.S. alliance contains a variety of elements. In the international community, the two countries need to respect universal values and arrange a forum for international debate and international order. The Obama administration is cautious about using armed force, so Japan will surely find it easier to cooperate

with the U.S. Countries aim at securing their national interests in negotiations with other countries. Japan must adjust its national interests to international interests. It is necessary for Japan to indicate a willingness to join international peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy operations. Canada has dispatched to Afghanistan 2,800 troops, suffering about 100 casualties. New Zealand has dispatched 150 out of its total 10,000 troops. I think Canada and New Zealand have set their minds on the need to fulfill their responsibility as global citizens.

-- Has Japan satisfactorily played its role in the international economic area?

Japan calls itself the second largest economic power, but it is gradually finding its status in jeopardy. Although Prime Minister Taro Aso expressed a positive stance in overcoming the ongoing financial crisis, Japan has performed no role in the new round of World Trade Organization (WTO) global trade talks (Doha Round) and has been left out of its core group. In my view, the U.S. has asked for opinions from Britain but has not sought Japan's opinion. Japan is not recognized as a responsible big power. The blame belongs with Japan.

-- Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit Japan in May. Is there any plan to break the impasse in negotiations on the Northern Territory issue? What does a "creative approach" [as said by President Dmitry Medvedev] mean?

In the latest Japan-Russia summit meeting in Sakhalin, the two leaders confirmed the need for "a new, creative and unconventional" approach. I think that an outcome that can convince the peoples of the two countries will never be produced as long as Japan insists on returning the four islands (the Habomais, Shikota, Kunashiri, and Etorofu) or two islands (the Habomais and Shikotan), while Russia refuses to return any of them. Both countries should draw up a grand strategic scheme, involving such challenges as energy, the

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environment, and development of Northeast Siberia. In it, the dispute over the four northern islands must be positioned in it. That is an unconventional approach. Some suggest that Japan and Russia should agree to designate the four northern islands after returned to Japan as non-military areas.

I personally back the idea of advocating the return of 3.5 islands so as not to leave the territorial row as a stumbling block to bilateral ties. The areas of the two islands account for only 7%. The reversion of half of Etorofu Island, the biggest of the four, and the three other islands is enough in terms of acreage, equivalent to the return of the four islands in effect.

(6) Poll on Aso cabinet, political parties

MAINICHI (Page 3) (Full)  
April 12, 2009

Questions & Answers

(T = total; P = previous; M = male; F = female)

Q: Do you support the Aso cabinet?

	T	P	M	F
Yes	24	(16)	25	24
No	56	(66)	64	51
Not interested	18	(17)	11	24

Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the above question) Why?

	T	P	M	F
Because the prime minister is from the Liberal Democratic Party	31			
(38)	28	34		
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's leadership	11	(3)	9	13
Because there's something friendly about the prime minister	21	(23)		
23	19			
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's policy				

measures 32 (22) 35 29

Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the above question) Why?

T P M F

Because the prime minister is from the Liberal Democratic Party 7  
(5) 10 4

Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's leadership  
32 (38) 28 (36)

Because there's something imprudent about the prime minister 19 (19)  
20 18

Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's policy  
measures 41 (36) 41 42

Q: Which political party do you support?

T P M F

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 23 (22) 24 21

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 24 (22) 31 19

New Komeito (NK) 5 (3) 4 6

Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (3) 3 3

Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 2 (2) 2 1

People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 1 (1) 1 1

Reform Club (RC or Kaikaku Kurabu) -- (--) -- --

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New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) -- 0

Other political parties 1 (2) 0 2

None 40 (43) 34 44

Q: North Korea launched a long-range ballistic missile, claiming it to be an artificial satellite. Do you think North Korea's missiles threaten Japan?

T P M F

Yes 79 76 81

No 19 22 17

Q: Concerning the North Korean missile launch, the Japanese government is insisting on severe actions, such as adopting a new resolution at the United Nations and taking additional economic sanctions against North Korea. Do you appreciate this diplomatic stance of Japan?

T P M F

Yes 76 76 76

No 20 21 19

Q: DPJ President Ozawa has clarified his intention to stay on as his party's head while his state-funded secretary is now facing charges for a violation of the Political Funds Control Law. What do you think he should do ahead of the next election for the House of Representatives?

T P M F

Stay on for the election 23 28 20

Resign before the election 33 29 35

Quit right away 39 38 39

Q: The DPJ has approved its President Ozawa's decision to stay on. Is this convincing?

T P M F

Yes 30 34 28

No 66 62 68

Q: Prime Minister Aso has indicated that he would prioritize the supplementary budget's passage over dissolving the House of Representatives for a general election. When do you think the House of Representatives should be dissolved for a general election?

T P M F

Right away 32 36 29

After the extra budget's passage 47 48 46

No need until the current term's expiry 16 12 18



Q: Who do you think is more appropriate for prime minister between Prime Minister Aso and DPJ President Ozawa?

T P M F

Prime Minister Aso 21 (10) 21 21  
DPJ President Ozawa 12 (13) 17 9  
Neither is appropriate 62 (73) 58 66

Q: Which party between the LDP and the DPJ would you like to see win in the next election for the House of Representatives?

T P M F

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LDP 32 (29) 30 33  
DPJ 42 (40) 51 35  
Other political parties 19 (23) 14 33

Q: Some municipalities have now begun to pay out a per capita cash benefit of 12,000 yen. Do you appreciate this cash benefit handout?

T P M F

Yes 39 34 43  
No 56 63 52

Q: The government has basically lowered the Saturday and Sunday expressway tolls to the upper limit of 1,000 yen for passenger cars equipped with the electronic toll collection (ETC) system and for some other vehicles. Do you appreciate this?

T P M F

Yes 51 49 52  
No 44 47 42

(Note) Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. "0" indicates that the figure was below 0.5%. "--" denotes that no respondents answered. "No answer" omitted. Figures in parentheses denote the results of the last survey conducted March 6-7.

Polling methodology: The survey was conducted April 10-11 over the telephone across the nation on a computer-aided random digit sampling (RDS) basis. A total of 1,903 households with one or more eligible voters were sampled. Answers were obtained from 1,150 persons (60%).

(7) Scope column: Stormy developments expected in drafting manifesto to include some of Aso's policy imprint

TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full)  
April 17, 2009

Yuji Shinogase

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is now preparing to draft a manifesto (set of campaign pledges) for the next general election that will come after the dissolution of the House of Representatives. A special team responsible for drafting a manifesto will likely be made up of junior and mid-level lawmakers. It will come under the direct supervision of Prime Minister Taro Aso. In order to reflect some of Aso's political identity in a manifesto, the team will be led by LDP Election Strategy Council Deputy Chairman Yoshihide Suga, a close aide to Aso. However, a consumption tax hike after economic recovery, which Aso has asserted, and a plan to reduce the number of Diet members will likely become new sources of contention, eliciting a strong reaction from within the LDP.

The LDP is not good at coming up with bold manifestos, since it is shackled politically to the various ministries and agencies, as well as to certain industrial associations.

Therefore, about 10 junior and mid-level lawmakers, who have few links with specific business interests or government agencies and who are not swayed by the views of factions they belong to, will be picked. The team will aim to draft a manifesto that will have contents different from the requests of party elements that are prone to comply with the wishes of industrial associations.

The outlook is that a program compiled by the party's Strategic Council for Revitalization of the Japanese Economy will become the basis for economic measures to be included in a manifesto. The question, however, is how to achieve agreement on areas other than fiscal resources and the economy.

The program includes a large-scale economic package worth 40 trillion yen, excluding fiscal measures, to be spread out over three years. It is safe to say that fierce debate over a future tax hike and the timing of it will take place in the process of drafting a manifesto.

A person close to Aso said: "The prime minister is enthusiastic about including the consumption tax issue in a manifesto." There is a possibility that the conflict over the consumption tax hike issue will likely flare up again in the LDP.

Suga is actively calling for including in the manifesto a promise to reduce the number of Diet members and to place restrictions on candidates running for Diet seats held by their parents, grandparents or uncles and aunts. Suga has insisted that if a consumption tax hike is included in the manifesto, lawmakers will need to make sacrifices. However, many in the LDP are cautious about decreasing the number of Diet seats. The team will likely have trouble ironing out differences of opinions on this within the party. If the team tries to cut through to the center in drafting a manifesto, there is a possibility that their efforts will spark a dispute in the party.

(8) Japan should take lead in "anti-piracy PKO" off Somalia

SANKEI (Page 7) (Slightly abridged)  
April 16, 2009

By Yohei Sasakawa, chairman of the Nippon Foundation

Piracy cases reported this year have already exceeded half of those reported last year

The two Maritime Self-Defense Force's (MSDF) warships now deployed in the Gulf of Aden off Somalia began in late March their mission of guarding Japan-related ships from possible attacks by pirates. Of the some 20,000 ships traveling through those waters each year, Japan-related vessels account for 10%. Given this, it stands to reason for Japan to dispatch MSDF vessels to the scene.

Japan dispatched the warships by invoking a provision for maritime patrols in the Self-Defense Forces Law. But under the provision, the MSDF is not allowed to protect ships unrelated to Japan. This distortion must be corrected first. Other countries will not be convinced by Japan's explanation that it cannot protect foreign vessels due to legal restrictions. Some persons have voiced their opposition [to the government's anti-piracy bill], insisting that the Japan Coast Guard should be responsible for all such operations. But to enable Japanese troops to take joint action with other countries' troops, the anti-piracy bill now on the Diet table must be urgently enacted.

Dozens of pirate groups have been rampant in waters near the Gulf of Aden. A mother ship carrying a small high-speed boat first chases a

targeted ship first and then the boat attacks the target in an attempt to hijack it. Pirates on board a ship equipped with such weapons as a rocket launcher are fierce. They demand and receive millions of yen as ransom. Since this is a low-risk but high-return crime, piracy is unlikely to decrease for the time being.

In the pirate-infested waters, 20 countries have deployed warships on a patrol mission, but 61 pirate-attack cases, more than half of

the number of incidents last year, have already been reported since January. Each nation's patrol operations might run out of steam for cost and other reasons if the current situation lasts long. It will become necessary sooner or later for each nation to establish a long-term patrolling system covering several years from now.

To deal with such a situation, I hope, the government will make diplomatic efforts to have the UN designate anti-piracy operations off Somalia as peacekeeping operations (PKO). Given that long-term cooperation among UN member countries is imperative to eliminate piracy, I think it is desirable for anti-piracy operations to be categorized as UN PKO. Such efforts will surely enable Japan to play up its presence in the international community and pave the way for Japan to become a permanent UNSC member.

#### Use leprosy case as lesson

There should first be a crackdown on weapons onboard unidentified ships moored off Somalia beaches. Meanwhile, surveillance from the sky should be promoted and warships dispatched by various countries should be effectively deployed. If an unidentified ship is spotted, the naval vessel that receives the information should inspect the ship and seize weapons. I think this process would work effectively to prevent piracy.

The government is urged to take the initiative in prompting the UN Security Council (UNSC) to make arrangements for this process. As seen from different responses made by countries to North Korea's recent missile launch, it is difficult for UNSC members, which have different systems and interests, to take joint steps. On the piracy issue, however, Russia, China and other countries have deployed warships to the waters off Somalia in order to fight their common enemy. About 40 countries are expected to participate in the anti-piracy mission in the end. It is unprecedented for this number of countries to take concerted action over a common issue.

Last year, the Japanese government presented to the UN Human Rights Council an antidiscrimination resolution for leprosy patients, recuperators, and their families. The resolution was presented jointly by 59 countries, including Cuba and China, which were opposed to a human rights resolution criticizing North Korea for its past abductions of Japanese nationals, and was unanimously adopted. Focusing on this experience and the fact that pirates are a common enemy for all UNSC members, I think it is fully possible for Japan to obtain approval from other members for its plan to construct a piracy PKO system. Somalia is in a state of anarchy, but a provisional government has been established there.

#### Japan should show guts as marine country

In a bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC, Japan has stressed it bears 16% of the operating costs of the UN, following the U.S. But this assertion is not enough to convince other members. In the international community, a country that bears both operating costs

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and risks can have a say.

"What will Japan do if it becomes a permanent UNSC member?" "What kind of contribution is Japan going to make?" We are often asked such questions by key foreign figures. Some countries criticize Japan for using its pacifist Constitution as a good excuse for avoiding the risk of sending troops to battlegrounds, and they see such as nothing more than a symbol of one-country pacifism. We, Japanese, must be aware that we are now in such an age. Over the past 60 years, the international community underwent a significant change.

Our nation is aiming to change "Japan being protected by the sea" into "Japan protecting the sea." In transporting goods across the world, 90% depends on maritime transportation. There are also a host of problems linked to the sea, such as environmental contamination. Meanwhile, Japan has abundant experiences and knowledge regarding the sea.

If Japan can take the initiative over anti-piracy PKO, Japan will

naturally have a stronger voice in the international community. Incidents of piracy also occurred frequently in the Straits of Malacca in the 1990s. But the number of attacks by pirates in the waters has significantly decreased as a result of enhanced marine security capabilities owing to desperate efforts made by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, all of which face the straits, as well as Nippon Foundation's cooperation. Japan, as a maritime country, is now urged to have the guts to contribute to ensuring that the seas are safe and in forming a oceanic order.

ZUMWALT